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This article examines the extent to which the random selection of political representatives could be a vehicle for social justice. Given its ability to bring representatives of disadvantaged groups into positions of power, the answer may seem positive. However, it assumes that the representatives selected by lot from these groups are capable of acting in the best interest of the group - and thus that they are aware of the injustices they suffer and of effective ways to fight them. Yet both Marxist thought and contemporary social psychology have shown that such an "injustice consciousness"is not evident for people educated and socialized in contexts dominated by anti-egalitarian ideologies. Such a conscience is sometimes acquired only after a rather slow process of collective politicization, in an agonistic dynamic. Far from condemning political sortition, taking this reality into account invites measuring the benefits of citizens' assemblies taking place over a longer time, and not to lose sight of some benefits of electoral democracy, such as the capacity of political parties to mobilize and raise consciousness and the essential role played by civil society. ; SCOPUS: re.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Parler du revenu de base (revenu universel, allocation universelle) au singulier n'a pas beaucoup de sens. Évaluer une telle proposition dans l'abstraction, sans préciser de quel modèle de revenu de base on parle, encore moins. Il s'agit en effet d'un instrument pouvant être mis au service d'une multitude de causes et aux effets très variés selon le projet politique présidant à son implémentation. Cet article propose pour cette raison de distinguer trois idéaux-types de revenu de base :néolibéral, social-démocrate et de transition écologique et sociale. Ces idéaux-types se distinguent par leurs caractéristiques internes (montant ;financement ;articulation avec les aides sociales existantes) et par les projets politiques qui les guident. La question de la radicalité du revenu de base dépend donc du modèle envisagé. Le modèle « néolibéral » est radical dans la simplification de l'État providence qu'il propose, tandis que le modèle « de transition » l'est dans ses visées de transformation des relations sociales et des dynamiques économiques. Le modèle « social-démocrate », quant à lui, n'entend pas révolutionner la protection sociale, mais constituer une réforme qui, tout en étant plus réaliste à court-terme, est susceptible d'initier une transformation plus graduelle des États sociaux dans le sens d'un renforcement de la protection sociale. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Epistemic justifications of democracy affirm the comparative quality of democracies' decisions. The challenge faced by those who endorse such views is to explain why we should prefer standard democratic institutions to some sort of epistocracy or rule of the wisest. This article takes up this challenge by assessing the epistemic potential of an epistocratic council, as imagined by Jason Brennan. Members of such council would be selected through competency exams, the required competencies being defined by the whole population. The argument defended in this article is that the potential gain in instrumental rationality that such an institution could offer under certain questionable conditions would be outweighed by the increased risks of misrule and involuntary biases if such council has decision-making or veto power. In comparison with the existing literature, this argument stresses the importance of moral rightness, here defined as impartiality, in the epistemic assessment of democracy and its alternatives. The article then ends with a qualified assessment of purely epistemic justifications of democratic inclusion, which could be insufficient to reject implausible but imaginable forms of epistemically justifiable disenfranchisement. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Abstract Political judgments usually combine a normative principle or intuition with an appreciation of empirical facts regarding the achievability of different options and their potential consequences. The interesting question dividing partisans of political idealism and realism is whether these kinds of consideration should be integrated into the normative principles themselves or considered apart. At first sight, if a theorist is concerned with guiding political judgments, non-ideal or realist theorizing (directly integrating such considerations) can seem more attractive. In this article, however, I argue that ideal theorizing might be considered valuable even by theorists moved by a pragmatic concern (guiding political judgments) because it is less exposed to conservatism. I nonetheless contend that the aim to guide action in the world as it is should not be abandoned. Therefore, I outline a four-step method for proceeding from abstract moral principles to concrete political judgments and apply it to a test case. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Revenu versé à l'ensemble des membres d'une communauté politique, sur base individuelle, sans contrôle de ressources ni exigences de contrepartie, le revenu universel fait débat à travers le monde depuis quelques dizaines d'années. C'est un instrument aux multiples formes, usages et justifications possibles, sur lequel on aurait tort de porter un jugement avant d'avoir examiné la version particulière dont on discute. Cet article vise à mettre en évidence les principales justifications philosophiques possibles d'un tel instrument de protection sociale et les principales objections qui peuvent lui être adressées en fonction de la forme qu'il revêt. Laissant relativement ouvertes les questions empiriques sur le financement d'un tel revenu et sur ses divers effets économiques et sociaux, il a pour but d'aider les lecteurs à se construire un cadre d'analyse philosophico-politique sur le sujet.

Empirical studies reveal many citizens' unwillingness to get rid of representative democracy. A great number of them, however, distrust their representatives and would want representation to be improved, for example by giving citizens more control over their representatives. One possible mechanism of control is the recall—the possibility to remove elected representatives from office through a vote before the end of their term. Although this democratic tool is on the rise worldwide and was supported in the past by influential figures such as Rousseau and Marx, its study has been neglected by contemporary political theorists. The aim of this contribution is to identify the main arguments for and against the use of recall mechanisms, and to assess both their normative and empirical validity. In particular, it asks whether they have the capacity to improve the quality of representation or at least the perception of representative institutions' legitimacy, and answers with a moderate "yes"—especially for the latter aspect (perceived legitimacy).

Revenu versé à l'ensemble des membres d'une communauté politique, sur base individuelle, sans contrôle de ressources ni exigences de contrepartie, le revenu universel fait débat à travers le monde depuis quelques dizaines d'années. C'est un instrument aux multiples formes, usages et justifications possibles, sur lequel on aurait tort de porter un jugement avant d'avoir examiné la version particulière dont on discute. Cet article vise à mettre en évidence les principales justifications philosophiques possibles d'un tel instrument de protection sociale et les principales objections qui peuvent lui être adressées en fonction de la forme qu'il revêt. Laissant relativement ouvertes les questions empiriques sur le financement d'un tel revenu et sur ses divers effets économiques et sociaux, il a pour but d'aider les lecteurs à se construire un cadre d'analyse philosophico-politique sur le sujet.

Empirical studies reveal many citizens' unwillingness to get rid of representative democracy. A great number of them, however, distrust their representatives and would want representation to be improved, for example by giving citizens more control over their representatives. One possible mechanism of control is the recall—the possibility to remove elected representatives from office through a vote before the end of their term. Although this democratic tool is on the rise worldwide and was supported in the past by influential figures such as Rousseau and Marx, its study has been neglected by contemporary political theorists. The aim of this contribution is to identify the main arguments for and against the use of recall mechanisms, and to assess both their normative and empirical validity. In particular, it asks whether they have the capacity to improve the quality of representation or at least the perception of representative institutions' legitimacy, and answers with a moderate "yes"—especially for the latter aspect (perceived legitimacy). ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Empirical studies reveal many citizens' unwillingness to get rid of representative democracy. A great number of them, however, distrust their representatives and would want representation to be improved, for example by giving citizens more control over their representatives. One possible mechanism of control is the recall—the possibility to remove elected representatives from office through a vote before the end of their term. Although this democratic tool is on the rise worldwide and was supported in the past by influential figures such as Rousseau and Marx, its study has been neglected by contemporary political theorists. The aim of this contribution is to identify the main arguments for and against the use of recall mechanisms, and to assess both their normative and empirical validity. In particular, it asks whether they have the capacity to improve the quality of representation or at least the perception of representative institutions' legitimacy, and answers with a moderate "yes"—especially for the latter aspect (perceived legitimacy).

Epistemic justifications of democracy affirm the comparative quality of democracies' decisions. The challenge faced by those who endorse such views is to explain why we should prefer standard democratic institutions to some sort of epistocracy or rule of the wisest. This article takes up this challenge by assessing the epistemic potential of an epistocratic council, as imagined by Jason Brennan. Members of such council would be selected through competency exams, the required competencies being defined by the whole population. The argument defended in this article is that the potential gain in instrumental rationality that such an institution could offer under certain questionable conditions would be outweighed by the increased risks of misrule and involuntary biases if such council has decision-making or veto power. In comparison with the existing literature, this argument stresses the importance of moral rightness, here defined as impartiality, in the epistemic assessment of democracy and its alternatives. The article then ends with a qualified assessment of purely epistemic justifications of democratic inclusion, which could be insufficient to reject implausible but imaginable forms of epistemically justifiable disenfranchisement.

What justifies majority decision making in democracies? Can we consider that the majority is more likely to be right? Didier Mineur reflects on the philosophical foundations of a rule that has become so self-evident in our societies.

Epistemic justifications of democracy affirm the comparative quality of democracies' decisions. The challenge faced by those who endorse such views is to explain why we should prefer standard democratic institutions to some sort of epistocracy or rule of the wisest. This article takes up this challenge by assessing the epistemic potential of an epistocratic council, as imagined by Jason Brennan. Members of such council would be selected through competency exams, the required competencies being defined by the whole population. The argument defended in this article is that the potential gain in instrumental rationality that such an institution could offer under certain questionable conditions would be outweighed by the increased risks of misrule and involuntary biases if such council has decision-making or veto power. In comparison with the existing literature, this argument stresses the importance of moral rightness, here defined as impartiality, in the epistemic assessment of democracy and its alternatives. The article then ends with a qualified assessment of purely epistemic justifications of democratic inclusion, which could be insufficient to reject implausible but imaginable forms of epistemically justifiable disenfranchisement.

What justifies majority decision making in democracies? Can we consider that the majority is more likely to be right? Didier Mineur reflects on the philosophical foundations of a rule that has become so self-evident in our societies.

« La première règle de la politique ? C'est d'être juste. La seconde ? C'est d'être juste. Et la troisième ? C'est encore d'être juste. » Voilà ce qu'écrivait le Marquis de Condorcet en 1777. Mais qu'est-ce qu'une politique juste, une société juste ? Qu'est-ce que la justice sociale ? Ces questions habitent la philosophie politique depuis des siècles. Le terme « justice » recouvre, dans le monde occidental au moins, deux concepts liés mais néanmoins très différents que sont la justice légale, d'une part, et la justice sociale, d'autre part. Le premier désigne une institution concrète – le pouvoir judiciaire – et des normes positives. Le second renvoie à un idéal normatif pour la société (nationale ou internationale). C'est à ce second sens du terme « justice » que s'intéresse cet article, à cette idée de justice qui réside au cœur de nombreuses luttes sociales et débats démocratiques. Tantôt invoquée pour lutter contre les discriminations, tantôt pour condamner les inégalités, tantôt pour s'opposer à des taux d'imposition jugés confiscatoires, la notion de justice (ou d'équité) est à la fois incontournable et susceptible des interprétations les plus diverses. Cet article propose un parcours entre différentes grandes familles de théories de la justice (libertarisme, marxisme, utilitarisme, égalitarisme, suffisantisme, féminisme, communautarisme) et aborde quelques-unes des principales questions qui ont animé les débats récents sur le sujet, comme la tension entre reconnaissance et redistribution, la nature des principes de justice, ou encore l'articulation entre justice sociale et éthique personnelle.